What potential result can occur if a CEO exercises their veto power over a budget document?

When a CEO, often synonymous with the head of an executive branch, exercises veto power over a budget document, a common and significant result is that the legislative branch has the opportunity to override that veto. This process is a fundamental aspect of the checks and balances inherent in many governmental frameworks.

When the veto occurs, it demonstrates the CEO's disapproval of the proposed budget, either due to specific allocations or broader fiscal policy disagreements. However, the legislative body retains the authority to counteract this veto, which typically requires a supermajority vote to be successful. This mechanism ensures that no single entity can unilaterally dictate financial governance without potential recourse from the legislative representatives of the populace.

In this context, the other options do not align with typical governmental practices. The legislative branch can still propose a new budget despite a veto, as their authority is not revoked. The veto does not lead to an immediate reapproval of the budget without changes, as that contradicts the purpose of exercising a veto. Additionally, agency heads do not assume control of budget decisions simply because of a veto; the established process should allow for dialogue and negotiation between the executive and the legislature to revise and address the concerns raised by the veto. Thus, the possibility for the